Working Against Iran, at a High Price |
As
the unipolar system in the world is being replaced by a multipolar one, geography and
national interests are becoming two major factors for Iran to define its foreign relations
including regional ties. This note attempts to draw a geopolitical perspective of
Iran’s position in the Caspian and Caucasus regions with respect to the transfer of
oil and gas from the region to international markets:
In an Iranian
perspective, building of a pipeline which connects the Caspian littoral states to the
Persian Gulf and Oman Sea through Iran, is said to be the most practical solution: this
is, by all means, the shortest, the safest and the most economical route to international
waters.
This is while the demand for oil in global markets, especially Japan and other Far East
nations, is predicted to increase on a steady mode in the future, and Iran boasts notable
technical advantages for playing a major role in the transfer of oil and gas to these
markets: A human force which is highly skilled in oil-related affairs, advanced
transportation, shipping and port facilities, refineries and the existing oil and gas
pipelines. Iranian national gas pipeline system is connected to that of Azerbaijan
Republic and is in a short distance from Turkmenistan. A pipeline which passes through
Kazakhstan to Turkmenistan is by estimate four times shorter and cheaper comparing to any
other alternatives which ends in Black Sea and the Mediterranean. A likely westward
pipeline from the region has no way but to pass through tough mountainous areas and
regions which are unsecure due to continual battles between various sects and opposing
policies. That’s why many advocate a pipeline which passes through Iran because of
its many advantages.
In September 1994, Iran and Turkmenistan agreed on a gas pipeline from the Central Asia to
Europe via Iran, while Iran agreed to pay 50% of the project costs. The pipeline, which
was supposed to be completed in 25 years, would carry 10-12 billion cu.m. of gas per year
in the first phase, and in the second phase it would be able to transfer a capacity of
28-30 billion cu.m. of gas.
In July 1995, Iran and Turkmenistan reached another agreement to build a second pipeline
which would connect the latter to the Iranian national gas pipeline network. Sixty
kilometers of the said pipeline would be located in the Iranian territory, but the signing
of the contract on Caspian seabed pipeline in 1999 from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan and
then to Ceyhan port in Turkey has probably stopped the previous similar projects which
would take oil and gas to Turkey through Iran.
This has mainly been a result of political pressures by certain countries outside the
region. In February 1999, Central Asian countries were told to avoid transferring their
oil through Iran.
In 1995, Iran and Turkmenistan held talks on building up an oil pipeline for transferring
that country’s oil to Iranian refineries with a capacity of 120,000 barrels per day.
Another pipeline with the capacity of 400,000 bpd for transferring Turkmen oil to the
Persian Gulf has been planned to be completed by 2002. Also, Iranian Oil Ministry has
submitted to Turkmen government a survey project along with relevant maps and the
specifications of pipelines for transferring Turkmen natural gas to Europe via Iran. The
proposed pipeline is 1400 km long and will be built at the cost of $3 billion with an
annual capacity of 15-30 million cu.m. of gas.
| Any
plan that ignores the Iranian position in the future transfer of the Caspian oil and gas
is far from being realistic |
Many businesses which
operate in Central Asia have so far expressed their interests to export their products
through Iran and the Persian Gulf. Many U.S. oil and gas companies have also announced
that they prefer the Iranian route; they demand the U.S. government to stop pursuing an
anti-Iranian policy in the region arguing that such a policy has been primarily to their
own detriment.
Iran has proposed a network of pipelines which
connects oil and gas exporters in the Caspian region to the Persian Gulf. Based on a plan
prepared by Iranian Foreign Ministry, the network includes a system of Iranian gas
pipelines able to link the gas resources of Russia and Iran, which constitute 75% of world
gas reserves, with Far Eastern markets through the Persian Gulf. Once operational, such a
network will be capable of linking huge gas reserves which will satisfy the gas needs in
the 21st century. Half of the pipeline would be located inside Iran.
In August 1995, Iran and India conduced a pact to construct a
pipeline to link India with Iranian and Central Asian gas resources with a length of 2000
km. This pipeline, which has recently been also approved by Pakistan, will be playing a
sensitive role in connecting the Central Asians with oil and gas consumers in the
Subcontinent and the Far East. Little wonder Pakistan is exerting extensive pressure for
setting up a network for connecting the natural gas resources of Iran and Central Asia
with southern parts of East Asia and beyond. After this agreement was reached with Iran,
Pakistan clinched an agreement with Turkmenistan in 1995 regarding a pipeline which would
connect Pakistan to Central Asia through Afghanistan. Once implemented, this plan will
materialize a significant multinational gas pipeline with starts in Iran and Central Asia.
However, there are concerns about the security conditions in Afghanistan, the mountainous
nature of the region and the length of the pipeline. These concerns may prevent the
realization of the Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline.
The export of oil and gas to global markets through the territories of a certain country
is always associated with political and security concerns. The best example of this is the
Iraqi oil pipeline which passes through Syria, Lebanon, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. All these
pipelines are now closed due to political and strategic reasons. Thanks to the stated
anti-Western position of Taliban, there will be no guarantee for the Afghan oil pipeline
to remain stable and secure for transferring oil and gas, something which is said to have
caused the United States to change its position toward Afghan Taliban in 1998.
On the other hand, in recent years the Chinese have shown great interest in being involved
in the Caspian and Central Asian geopolitics. China has signed a number of political and
economic pacts with Russia and Iran: a contract with Turkmenistan for purchasing natural
gas in 1997 and another with Iran in the same year for oil cooperation which can improve
Iran’s role in the Caspian and Central Asian oil and gas transfer.
This is while Azerbaijan Republic apparently has not totally rejected Iran’s role in
its oil exports. In 1994, Azerbaijan allocated 5% of its share in Azerbaijan International
Oil Consortium (AIOC) to Iran’s participation in exporting Azeri oil in Caspian Sea
through a pipeline which extended from Iran to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast. A
contract was signed on February 3, 1995, between AIOC and NIOC following which the Azeri
side officially made the said share available to Iran, but then took it back in April of
the same year under U.S. pressures. In December 1995, after studying more than 10
pipelines which lasted for one year, the AIOC, most part of which belongs to US companies,
chose a Russian pipeline plan for exporting Azeri oil through the Chechen Republic and
Georgia.
The Iranian position in the future planning for transfer of the Caspian oil and gas is not
something which can simply be ignored by any country. The United States has eased its
anti-Iranian policies since mid-1998. In May 1995, the Azerbaijan Republic announced that
it would export part of the crude produced by the AIOC through Iran and the Persian Gulf
through a swap contract with Iran. Thus, Iran continues to remain as an option for
transferring the Azeri oil in the future.
A similar agreement, if reached, may materialize oil exports from Tangiz oil field in
Kazakhstan. In addition to its exploration activities in the Caspian Sea, Iran established
a company with Russia and the Azerbaijan Republic in 1995 for exploration in the Caspian.
Based on one of these contracts, Iran and Azerbaijan agreed to jointly launch exploration
in Iran’s offshore region of the Caspian Sea.
The Azeri-Iranian cooperation in the Sea can be part of their amiable, neighborly
relations. The Caspian oil fields are located next to the joint borders of Iran and
Azerbaijan. The need to prevent horizontal drilling by either side and relying on the
local know-how can be a geo-economic basis for joint exploration and extraction activities
by Iran and Azerbaijan. From a geopolitical point of view, Iran and Azerbaijan have no
choice but to cooperate with each other in this regard. In addition to cultural and
religious commonalities, also common geography, natural resources, joint economic efforts
and territorial security issues should serve as a basis for further affinity between them. |
