January 2006, No. 38

Editorial

Iran and the Redistribution of Power The US is now trying to transfer a portion of Iran’s nuclear facilities to Russia, so it can effectively deprive Iran from enrichment technology and keep it at the primary refining stage.

Dr. Ali Larijani, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator

As expected, on December 1st, 2005, the Governing Council of the International Atomic Energy Agency passed no resolution against Iran, and instead the Council’s head just read out a diplomatically-correct statement, reiterating the previous resolutions and announcing that Iran’s case will only be closed with the complete halt to uranium enrichment. Iran has repeatedly emphasized that it will not yield to this demand. Even though the Vienna Statement may not be as legally binding as the previous resolutions, but its setup is indicative of a new approach adopted by international players towards Iran’s nuclear issue; a new approach may have much more long-term effects than previous binding resolutions.

What is this new approach and what does it mean for Iran?

1. Legal and Political Order: The resolutions that were passed by the IAEA in regards to Iran’s nuclear issue until September 2005 were all within the framework of international law. International law is series of treaties, costumes and legislations which countries party to international organizations and conventions must abide by. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is one such international convention which Iran is a party to and thus, must abide by.

NPT is set up in a way that it officially recognizes for member states, including Iran, the right to access nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. During its negotiations, Iran has pursued its objectives by relying on this very principle, and the support Iran has received from other countries from time to time is based on this fact. But treaties and conventions under international law actually arise from the political order of the international community and are thus unavoidably affected by political power. In effect, at first countries struggle with one another to define scope of power and influence and then pass the relevant legal rules to maintain this order. In the current legal order, the United States, who is the main challenger of Iran’s nuclear program, cannot achieve its objectives. This failure is not based on the actual incapability of that country, but rather on realities rooted in the Cold War era. According to that order, the US had officially recognized some limitations to its sphere of influence and power in regards to Europe, Russia and China. But since 1991, the US no longer recognizes these limitations, and these countries, who lack the required political and economic tools to withstand the US, are relying on their only leverage—principles of international law. Today, the Americans are trying to define new customs and conventions for the new international order. This is the "redistribution of global power."

2. Redistributing the World: The Americans presumed that after World War II, due to the undeniable realities of bigger powers, the world was divided into scope of power and spheres of influence. In that order, the USSR, due to its military and ideological strength, and China, due to its strong regional influence in the Pacific were to be recognized. But today the US no longer recognizes such a standing for these two countries. The US considers Russia as an influential player in the Balkans and a limited—and aligned to US interests—player in the Caucasus and Central Asia and to some extent the Middle East. The US even considers Russia’s veto power to be unjust, and merely withholds its objections due to Russia’s considerable nuclear reserves. China is also merely considered as an economic player. Thus, the leaders of the United States are constantly looking for an opportunity to change the current world order. The stance of Washington’s leaders against the United Nations’ world order, which has been repeatedly expressed in the statements coming out of Washington especially by figures such as Paul Wolfowitz, the theorist of the conservatives, is testimony to this fact.

In this context, the US tries to pick on Russia’s weak spots in political and economic fields, such as the crises in Chechnya and the unsuccessful economic reforms of Vladimir Putin, to force Russia to admit to the real extent of its political power. In regards to China, America picks on human rights violations in Tibet and the government’s anticompetitive and supportive programs in the economic sector. The Americans believe that if China eases its political pressures, and ceases governmental intervention in the economy, the myth of China’s power will be dispelled, and one can no longer consider it to be one of five countries justified in wielding a veto at the United Nations Security Council. China would then be comparable to countries like Mexico, India, Brazil, Japan and Germany in this regard, meaning that if Chinese factors were the basis upon which countries were admitted to the Security Council, then the five above-mentioned countries should also have a veto power.

3. Affects on Iran: The Americans have used this new look in international relations in Iran’s nuclear case as well. They first agreed to European negotiations to determine the weight of the three main powers of the continent, namely France, Germany and England. Afterwards they brought Russia to the nuclear negotiating table.

Thus, whatever conclusion Iran’s nuclear issue comes to, it will turn a page in international relations and the principles which shape international treaties will redefine the limits on power and spheres of influence of the international actors. What was stated in the latest statement in the Vienna Meeting, is in effect an announcement of the stance adopted by each of these international players, each of which must now prove if they are capable of independently pursuing their objectives or not.