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March 2006, No. 39


Banking

The Central Bank of Iran will enhance its activities in four fields: Garz-al-Hassaneh funds, credit cooperatives, leasing companies and, finally, money changers.

Three Major Challenges
Facing Central Bank of Iran

Dr. Ebrahim Sheibani, the Governor of the Central Bank of Iran

Managers and officials of the Central Bank of Iran are grappling with a number of major challenges in the concluding months of 2005.

The first challenge is their effort at organizing and controlling money market. The Central Bank of Iran was witness to activities of certain centers called Garz-al-Hassaneh (interest-free) funds which embarked on monetary and banking activities and their financial turnover was quite remarkable. Even supervision over those bodies was delegated to Islamic Republic of Iran Police. At first, the Cabinet passed ratification according to strip the police of supervisory powers over those funds and took steps to organize Iran’s money market by preparing a bill on unorganized money market. On August 1, 2005, the Central Bank of Iran sent the executive bylaw of the bill to the government. At present, it is waiting for the bill to be approved by the government. In that case, the Central Bank of Iran will enhance its activities in four fields: Garz-al-Hassaneh funds, credit cooperatives, leasing companies and, finally, money changers.

The Central Bank of Iran has issued a notice through communiqués addressed to all owners and directors of Garz-al-Hassaneh funds to fill in their specifications in special forms released by the bank as a prelude to pave the way for granting permits to Garz-al-Hassaneh funds. The Central Bank of Iran believes that about 90 percent of Garz-al-Hassaneh funds have not violated regulations and recent years’ crises is a result of performance of some of them in generating illegal money. Of course, quantity of such funds is not high, but many big Garz-al-Hassaneh funds have violated regulations one way or another. The Central Bank of Iran also is planning to require Garz-al-Hassaneh funds after notification of the executive bylaw of unorganized money market bill, to observe a capital adequacy of, at least, 15 percent. Meanwhile, the Central Bank of Iran is still facing challenges from major and influential funds including three funds which are affiliated to the police force and other military bodies. The first of those funds is Qavvamin Garz-al-Hassaneh Fund, which is operated by the Islamic Republic of Iran Police. Since that fund has accepted major requirements of the Central Bank of Iran, it is currently faring properly.

If price of such goods as electricity and gasoline are kept down forcefully by the government and price hike which should happen to general level of prices at the juncture is carried over to next periods, this will lead to erosion of production capacity.

When state-run and private banks of Isfahan failed to accept the Central Bank’s demands for organizing such funds, Qavvamin Garz-al-Hassaneh Fund took steps to solve the problem. For this reason, the fund was granted permits to work as a financial and credit institute and its violations were treated superficially by the Central Bank of Iran. However, ownership of Qavvamin Garz-al-Hassaneh Fund, which belongs to police force, is the main obstacle on the way of granting it a permit to work as financial and credit institute and despite much publicity on the part of the fund; such permit has not yet been issued. That is, from the viewpoint of the Central Bank of Iran, the fund is still considered as a Garz-al-Hassaneh fund and not a credit and finance institute and it has only agreement in principle has been issued for Qavvamin Garz-al-Hassaneh Fund.

Officials of the fund should think of ways to transfer its ownership from the police force to a public joint stock company through underwriting; so as to remove the main hurdle on the way of its transformation into a credit and finance institute because public or state-run bodies are not allowed to establish new finance institutes and this has not happened thus far. Following suit with Qavvamin, Basijian and Ansar-ol-Mojahedeen Garz-al-Hassaneh funds, which are run by Basij and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, have been seeking permits to work as money and credit institutes. Therefore, the Central Bank of Iran has been offered with two applications for the establishment of new financial and credit institutes called, Mehr (by Basij forces) and Ansar (by Ansar-ol-Mojahedeen). Since those institutes would belong to peripheral institutions as well as cooperatives related to Basij force or the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, it is easier to give them permits, because they can be excluded from public institutions one way or another. Therefore, required permits will be issued for those financial institutes before long and they will start to work alongside Basijian and Ansar-ol-Mojahedeen funds. Another phase of Central Bank of Iran’s plans is to increase number of authorized money changers inside the country. Thus far, 170 money changers have been authorized by officials of the Central Bank of Iran. Due to increased number of foreign travels, especially those related to Hajj pilgrimage and fraudulent activities of some foreign exchange sellers, the Central Bank of Iran is planning to increase the number of authorized money changers to 250 across Iran after notification of the bill on unorganized money market; so as to prevent repetition of what happened to Hajj pilgrims in buying forged dollars. It was revealed a while ago that dollar banknotes whose numbers start with DL or DF and have been printed in 2003, have been forged.

One of the conditions stipulated by the Central Bank of Iran for authorizing money changers is having a minimum capital of 100 million tomans in Tehran and half of that figure in other cities for partnership companies which can ask for money changing permits.

Organizing leasing companies is another phase of the Central Bank of Iran’s plans. According to current statistics, thus far, 250-300 companies have been registered at the Registry of Companies the initial capital of some of them has been registered at 100,000 tomans.

For this reason, apart from considering moral and specialized conditions for handing out permits to leasing companies, the Central Bank of Iran is planning to consider a minimum capital level of about one billion tomans. Of course, since performance of leasing companies is quite the opposite of Garz-al-Hassaneh funds, it has caused less concern among officials of the Central Bank of Iran. In Garz-al-Hassaneh funds, people deposit money and the fund uses people’s money for granting facilities while in leasing, the company grants loans or embarks on credit sales with people paying only a small part of the price of what they buy. At the same time, survival of leasing companies becomes more important than people’s money. However, since growth and development of the leasing industry greatly relieves the domestic banking system, organizing them has become a priority for the Central Bank of Iran.

Inflation is not only a concern of senior officials of the Central Bank of Iran, but also a preoccupation for high-ranking governmental authorities. The new government, whose votes mainly came from disadvantaged social classes, is well aware that inflation will lead to dissatisfaction of those classes. Directors of the Central Bank of Iran are also aware of that. High number of interviews made with and reports issued by directors of the Central Bank of Iran, who are regularly camera-shy, substantiates this. Both Ebrahim Sheibani, the optimistic governor of the Central Bank of Iran, and Akbar Komijani, his economic deputy, have told student news agency, ISNA, and have written articles in Trend magazine (official organ of the bank) to the effect that they have tried to adapt retail index of the spent months of the year with the preceding year to convince people that inflation rate during the current year is no different from the preceding year and is even less. Apart from general atmosphere in the society, which rejects this, people who see something else in their everyday lives, also pose other questions.

Where will a 35-percent increase in liquidity during the current year show itself? Interestingly, the Central Bank of Iran talks about stagnation in housing sector and announces that composition of investments according to various stages of construction, indicate that buildings whose construction has begun are dwindling in all urban areas of the country both in terms of quantity and total buildup area. Therefore, the number of construction permits issued in Tehran, other big cities, and other urban areas has been reduced 16 percent, 8 percent and 7 percent, respectively. This point shows that part of liquidity in housing sector has been added to the liquidity of the country because capital aspects of the Iranian housing sector reaches far beyond its consumption aspects; that is, it is part of assets. The high number of residential units in northern and central parts of Tehran attests to this fact.

Darkness of many stories of high-rises in Tehran in the night, shows that some of their owners have purchased their houses as an asset to sell them when market conditions are favorable. Many people looking for houses are not basically buyers of such units and stagnation in the housing sector shows that those seeking housing avoid entering this market and accepting its long-term responsibilities due to lack of trust in their future revenues and housing speculators are assessing future conditions of the market.

Now, this liquidity has grown by 35 percent during the current year and is idle in the society until it is invested somewhere quite accidentally. Therefore, a big danger is threatening the society and if that liquidity enters any market the result will be inflation and high prices. However, the liquidity, which is taken into consideration when appraising assets, is not taken into account when determining retail sales index by the Central Bank of Iran. Retail sales index of the Central Bank of Iran is based on sampling consumer goods. During recent years, due to increased state revenues through oil sales, the government has been able to control goods market either through imports or through subsidies and prevent negative effects of burgeoning liquidity on the market.

Apart from foreign exchange rate, which is deliberately controlled by the Central Bank of Iran, other goods which are considered capital and other assets such as housing are not immune from excessive growth of liquidity which is not reflected in the Central Bank of Iran’s index. Therefore, retail sales index of the Central Bank of Iran can be criticized for three flaws. Firstly, goods sampling by the bank may not be accurate enough because sampling done by Iran Statistics Center has shown a higher figure than the Central Bank of Iran’s sampling during the past years.

The second flaw is not reflecting liquidity in capital goods and assets in retail sales index because people are not solely tolerating inflationary pressures from consumer goods, but other goods impose inflationary pressures on them.

The third weakness is accounting method used by the Central Bank of Iran. When calculating its own index, the Central Bank of Iran pays no attention to artificial stability of price of such important goods as gasoline. If price of such goods as electricity and gasoline are kept down forcefully by the government and price hike which should happen to general level of prices at the juncture is carried over to next periods, this will lead to erosion of production capacity. At the same time, artificial stability will increase consumption cost and erodes a capacity, whose rehabilitation will need added resources. When those resources for rehabilitating production are not supplied, general level of prices will further increase. All these factors will be manifested in inflationary pressures imposed on people, which are easily ignored by retail sales of the Central Bank of Iran.

The third weakness is more of an ambiguity than a challenge. Kayhan newspaper had recently reported that ceiling of prizes given by Garz-al-Hassaneh (interest-free) bank accounts to depositors has been reduced to 25 million tomans. That is, the biggest prize considered for holders of such accounts will amount to 25 million tomans and saving has been mentioned as the main reason. The report added that banks will limit their publicity in this regard and High Banking Council would soon notify the banks of the decision. The decision aimed at reducing extravagance. Since the Central Bank of Iran has not denied that report, it seems to be true. However, there are several questions about the decision which cause such saving to seem superficial.

The first question: What is proportion of Garz-al-Hassaneh accounts to total bank accounts? According to statistics on performance of Iran’s banking system, total Garz-al-Hassaneh deposits account for 8 percent of total bank deposits and amount to 5,000 billion tomans.

The second question: Doesn’t the government plan to reduce profit rate of bank facilities? Aren’t Garz-al-Hassaneh loans the only bank facilities without profit? Isn’t that true that the more Garz-al-Hassaneh deposits which banks attract, the more they will be able to give Garz-al-Hassaneh loans?

Therefore, if the government moved to dampen motivation for opening Garz-al-Hassaneh accounts, reduction of Garz-al-Hassaneh facilities granted by banks will follow. Is this not contradictory to government’s axial policy for reducing profit rate of bank facilities? Doesn’t it mean that the banks are planning to shrink their Garz-al-Hassaneh deposits on the pretext of saving?

Third question: What is the problem with giving prizes on Garz-al-Hassaneh accounts?

To judge about such prizes, we must pay attention to criteria for recognizing usury. Usury is a contract signed by two people, which is firstly a loan contract; and secondly, it stipulates an increasing interest rate. In this case, relationship between depositor and bank is based on loan. That is, the first criterion is present here, but the second condition does not exist. That is, the depositor cannot oblige the bank to give the prize. They cannot condition depositing in banks on receiving prizes because banks are under no obligation to give prizes to anybody. They only draw lots at the end of the year and the lucky winners will be given prizes. Deposits that enter the bank would belong to the bank according to a loan contract. A loan contract is when a person loans to another person and from that moment, the money will belong to the person who is given the loan. He can do anything with that money, but is under obligation to return it to loaner in due time. In Garz-al-Hassaneh saving accounts, when depositor gives his/her money to the bank, the bank will own that money and can use it to whatever purpose it deems exigent. Part of those deposits will be kept by the Central Bank of Iran as legal deposits, which is about 17 percent, while another part will be kept by the bank as liquidity to be given to customers, which accounts for 3-5 percent of deposits. The two figures make up a total of 22 percent. About 78 percent is effective balance of Garz-al-Hassaneh accounts. Approximately, 50 percent of that 78 percent will be paid as Garz-al-Hassaneh loans on such affairs as charities, job creation, marriage and the like. Prizes are provided through profit of deposits and through commissions that banks take from those receiving Garz-al-Hassaneh loans. Therefore, at a time when no solution has been presented for reducing cost of money in state-run banks, which is much higher than private banks and international standards, cutting prizes of Garz-al-Hassaneh accounts under the pretext of saving is questionable.

 

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  March 2006
No. 39